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The essence of democracy rests in an enlightened 
populace* To insure literacy auong its people and to prepare 
them to live upright, honorable and useful lives in a 
democratic state, our nation established free public education. 
The education offered to a free people should afford each 
Individual the opportunity to go forth well informed and 
well equipped in the basic principles of life. In our school 
program, standards have been established whose attainment 
harmoniously develops the Intellectual, volitional, emotional, 
physical and religious powers of man. It is by training the 
whole man teat we have in the past and will in the future, 
continue to send forth progressive citizens to maintain the 
growth and prosperity of our country. 
The educational standards established in our school 
systems and the type and mode of instruction which has been 
and is now being received by the youth of our land, are 
best understood from a review of school law and a perusal 
of State and federal Supreme Court decisions affecting this 
law. This article, from an analysis of Supreme Court 
decisions involving expulsion, answers questions pertinent 
to the scholastic, disciplinary and patriotic training 
no?/ being administered in our public schools. 
3. 
Section A* 
Decisions Arising from expulsion because of refusal 
to obey knoYm rules and regulations establish the degree 
to which we can discipline students in our public schools. 
Tills is reviewed in Chapter II. 
Section B. 
The duties of the school co iaittee and teachers in 
developing and maintaining a suitable curriculum and 
advancement standards are clearly defined by the Judgments 
. 
. 
rendered in expulsion cases curieing from scholarship. _ 
This is reviewed in Chapter III. 
Section C. 
Opinions handed down by *->tate and Federal Courts in 
cases involving the expulsion of members of a particular 
sect, the Jehovah Witnesses, for refusal to salute and 
pledge allegiance to the flag emphasize the importance of 
patriotic ceremonies in our school program. This is 
reviewed in Chapter IV. 
The conformity of school law within the several 
states allows us to restrict the sections on scholarship 
and discipline to an analysis of cases in the New England 
States. In Section C all cases in the United States 
pertaining to the expulsion of the Jehovah Witnesses 
are reviewed. 
' ' : T.' '* 
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Discipline la the conformity of an individual 
in conduct and behavolr to established atanoardo 
which are conducive to good orderly working 
conditions. 
ihis portion of the article by a perusal of 
State Supreme Court decisions involving expulsion for 
misconduct proposes to answer the following questions: 
1. liat is the extent of the authority granted 
to school committees to make rules and regulations 
for governing the schools? 
2. lay the ochool committee expel a student 
who does not conform to the rules and regulations? 
3. Kay the school coi^nittee expel a student 
for improper action off the school premises? 
4. Are the decisions of the school committee 
subject to revision by the courts? 
5. Dust every etatezaent regarding the maintenance 
of the schools be formally voted and recorded by the 
school committee? 
6. 
6. Is a pupil entitled to a hearing by the 
school committee before being permanently excluded 
for misconduct? 
7. Is a pupil present for a hearing before the 
school committee entitled to reveal all the facts 
in the case? 
a. Y/hat authority is granted to teachers to 
maintain discipline in the schools? 
9. Is corporal punialiment by proper authority 
Justified? 
10, Hay an individual expelled from a public 
school bring an action against the city or town? 
7 
STATUTES GOVERNIm SCHOOL HISCIPLIHE. In order that 
the decisions rendered by the Courts may be more 
clearly understood, the educational laws governing 
discipline in I'ass&chusetts are listed below. 
MASSACHUSETTS. 
Chapter 71, Section 37. Duties of school 
coraaittec. It shall have general charge of all the 
public schools, including the evening schools and evening 
high schools and of vocational schools and departments 
when not otherwise provided for. It may determine, 
subject to this chapter, the n imber of weeks and hours 
during which such schools shall be in session, and may 
make regulations as to attendance therein. 
Chapter 71, Section 47 (As amended 1935, 199). 
Committee may supervise athletic and other school 
organisations. The committee may supervise and control 
athletic and other organizations composed of public 
school pupils and bearing the school name and organized 
in connection therewith. It may directly or through an 
authorized representative determine under what conditions 
the same may compete with similar organizations in other 
schools. Expenditures by the committee for the 
organization and conduct of physical training and 
exercises, athletics, sports, games and play, for 
providing proper apparatus, equipment, supplies, athletic 
wearing apparel and facilities for the same in the 
buildings, yards and playgrounds under the control of 
the committee, or upon any other land which it may 
have the right or privilege to use for this purpose and 
for the employment of experienced athletic directors to 
supervise said physical training and exercises, athletics, 
sports, games and play, shall be deemed to be for a 
school purpose. 
Chapter 76, Section 17. Pupil not to be excluded 
without hearing. A school committee shall not permanently 
exclude a pupil from the public schools for alleged 
misconduct without first giving him and his parents or 
guardian an opportunity to be heard. 
8 
LAW CASKS INVOLVING EXPUiaiOH FOR MISCONDUCT. A brief 
digest of misconduct cases in Massachusetts, Connecticut 
and Hew Hampshire follows. 
HENRY HODGKINS VS. INHABITANTS OF ROCKPORT 
105 lass. 475 
In June, 1068, the plaintiff, a pupil in the Rockport 
High School, Rockport, Massachusetts, was excluded from 
school for alleged misconduct, i.e. whispering, laughing, 
acts of playfulness and rudeness to the other pupils, 
inattention to study, conduct tending to cause confusion 
and distractthe attention of other scholars from their 
studies and recitations persisted in after repeated 
remonstrances and admonitions by the teachers and members 
of the committee. 
The counsels for the plaintiff argued that the 
dismissal was irregular because two members of the school 
committee expelled the boy prior to the vote of the full 
committee. 
In superior court, trial by Jury was waived and the 
court ruled that the action could not be maintained, and 
found for the defendants. 
9 
The State ouprene Court on the question of whether 
or not the exclusion was lawful, gave the following 
judgment: 
1. Sixteenth (16th) section of Chapter thirty-eight 
(38) of the General Statues provides that the school 
committee, "shall have the general charge and superintend¬ 
ence of all the public schools in town." ‘this general 
power, by necessary implication, included the power to 
make all reasonable rules and regulations for the discipline, 
government and management of the schools, and also the 
power to exclude a child from school for sufficient cause. 
2. 3chool committees are required by law to visit the 
schools frequently, for the purpose of inquiring "into the 
regulation and discipline of the schools and habits and 
proficiency of the scholars therein;" and they are thus in 
a situation to Judge better than any other tribunal, what 
effect such misconduct has upon the usefulness of the school 
and welfare of the other scholars; and if they exercise 
this power in good faith, their decision is not subject 
to revision by the court. 
3. School committee acted in good faith on the 
question within thoir discretion and upon which their 
action Is conclusive when they excluded the plaintiff 
from school, "on account of his general persistence in 
10. 
disobeying the rules of the school, to the injury of 
the school." 
4. :<o force is seen in trie objection that the 
proceedings of the school committee was irregular. 
t. lower of the school corsraittee can be delegated 
to its various members and the teachers. In this case, 
two members ofthe committee sent the plaintiff from 
school, and on the same day reported the case to the 
full committee, who unanimously voted to exclude him. 
There is no irregularity in these proceedings which 
gives the plaintiff a right of action against the 
town; the plaintiff is not entitled to maintain this 
action. 
HUS8K1X YS. IYUNFITUJ) 
116 lass. 366 
A member of the School Committee of the Town of 
Lynnfleld, Massachusetts, made the following rule which 
was assented to by the two remaining members of the 
committee: 
"In consequence of much tardiness during the last 
school term, I made the rule that whrn a scholar was twice 
tardy, that the teacher send the scholar to me." 
11. 
On April 24 the plaintiff mm tardy for the second 
time. She waB told to report to the school committee 
member; instead, she went directly home. For this dis¬ 
obedience she waB suspended from school until she would 
conform to the roles. 
The plaintiff declaring that she had been unlawfully 
suspended, sought damages. She argued that: 
1. olnce the expulsion, wade for disobedience of a 
rule relating to tardiness, had been wade by a member of 
the school committee without a vote of the board or a 
vote confirming same, the expulsion is unlawful. 
2. Kxawination of the bdoles of the school committee 
showed no record that the rule had been made or 
confirmed. 
3be Superior Court ruled for the defendant, the 
case was then referred to the Supreme Court which, 
upholding the lower court, ruled: 
1, School committees are required to have general 
charge and superintendence of all public schools in town 
and to keep a record of their vote, order and proceed¬ 
ings; this doeo not imply that all rules and orders 
required for the discipline and good conduct of the 
school shall be a matter of record with the committee 
12 • 
or that every act in regard to the management of each 
school in these respects should be authorized or 
confirmed by formal vote, 
2. Reasonable exercise on the part of the teacher 
of the poT/er necessary to punish disobedience and promote 
the proper government and discipline of the school was 
in this instance in no -way diminished by the fact that 
tiie teacher acted under the direction of one member of 
the committee according to a rule made by him but 
expressly approved by each of the other members* 
JOHN F. DAVIS V3. CITY OF BOSTON 
133 Kass. 1G3 
The plaintiff, a child fourteen (14) years of age, 
attending a public school in the City of Boston, was 
expelled by a teacher for failure to submit to punishment. 
The plaintiff had been disobedient and impertinent 
in school and the teacher had reason to administer corporal 
punishment. The boy refused to submit to punishment and 
was sent to the school principal; instead he wont right 
home. The child returned to school several days later and 
professed a willingness to submit to the punishment. 
However, b< fore the punishment was completed, he refused 
to submit to further punishment and was sent to the 
principal; again he went home. 
13, 
After the above incident, profeesing willingness 
to submit to punishment, then refusing to undergo 
complete punishment, had been repeated several times, 
the teacher ordered the boy home and told him he could 
not return to class until he had submitted to punishment. 
At a meeting of the plaintiff, his father and the 
principal, hr. baton, the plaintiff stated that he was 
ready to receive the punishment but that he would not 
say that he was willing to receive such punishment. 
Since I'r. baton, by order of the school committee, could 
not punish the plaintiff unless he was willing to receive 
such punishment, he ordered the boy to go home and said 
that he would not have him in school unless he was 
willing to be punished. 
The plaintiff maintained that: 
1, The teacher acted without authority in expelling 
the boy from school, and brought an action against the 
city for damages for unlawful expulsion, 
2, The punishment inflicted on him by the teacher, 
when he refused to submit to further punishment by her, 
was excessive. 
The Superior Court Judge ruled that the evidence 
offered bythe plaintiff was not sufficient to sustain 
14 
action and directed a verdict for the defendant. 
The SupreisiaiaCourt handed down the following ruling; 
1* Plaintiff has no right to bring an action against 
the city without first appealing to the school committee. 
2. Unless the teacher is acting under some order of 
the committee, the only way of ascertaining whether the proper 
authorities, for whose action the city or town is made 
responsible, have excluded the child is by appealing to the 
school committee; no appeal was m de in this case. 
3. To hold that whenever a teacher sends a child home 
as punishment, the parent may treat it as an expulsion, and 
sue the city or town, would lead to vexatious litigation, 
and impair the diolpllne and usefulness of the schools. 
4. Plaintiff in this case, therefore, has failed to 
show an expulsion from school for which the city is liable. 
WILBERT A. BISHOP V3. IHHABITAtfTS 03? ROWLEY 
165 Mass. 460 
In accordance with Chapter 71, Section 37 of the General 
Laws pertaining to education, the School Committee of Rowley, 
Massachusetts, adopted the following rule: 
*As a punishment for disobedience or misbehavoir on 
the part of the pupil, his teacher should send him to the 
school committee, or seme member thereof, for a permit to 
15 
return to the school and such pupil should not be 
allowed to return to the school without such p€?rmit." 
A student whose name was not known to the teacher 
was seen throwing gravel against a class room window. 
The teacher asked the plaintiff , a pupil in her room, 
the name of the boy; although the plaintiff knew the boy’s 
name, he refused to tell. Claiming that the plaintiff’s 
manner was disrespectful and impudent, the teacher excluded 
him from the school until he should receive permission 
from the school committee to return. 
fhe plaintiff refused to apply to the school committee 
for permission to return. 
The plaintiff's father applied to the school committee 
for & hearing concerning the alleged misconduct but the 
committee refused to give such a hearing. 
Through counsel, the plaintiff requested the Judge to 
rule that there had been an unlawful exclusion from a 
public school within the meaning of the statutes; and 
that he was entitled to recovor damages therefor. 
The Judge of the lower court ruled for the defendants; 
no unlawful expulsion; plaintiff not entitled to any 
damages. 
The State Supreme Court, reversing the ruling of 
the lower court, handed down the following decision: 
16 
1. School committee has the right to expel a 
student from school and if the school committee acts in 
good faith in determining the facts in a particular case, 
its decision cannot be revised by the courts, 
2• In the present case, the facts were in dispute 
and a hearing was asked for on the question of fact and 
it was refuseo. Under these circumstances, the permanent 
exclusion of the plaintiff from the school was unlawful. 
The school committee should have given the plaintiff or 
hie father & chance to be heard upon the facts. The 
plaintiff, therefore, was entitled to maintain an 
action against the t own, 
JIORRISOIf V3. LAWR3NCB 
181 Base. 127 
In the following case the plaintiff was accused by 
the high school principal of inciting other pupils to 
write articles for a local newspaper criticising the 
principal. The pupil denied the accusation, bit the 
principal persisted in his accusation and the pupil was 
finally expelled from school. 
The plaintiff sought damages from the public schools 
for alleged unlawful exclusion on the grounds that he 
was not granted a fair hearing before being expelled. 
17 
Following is a review of the hearing granted to the 
plaintiff. 
1. The principal read a written statement of what 
he contended to he the facts in the case. The principal’s 
report named a number of hoys, pupils at the school, as 
persons from whom he got some of his information as to 
part of the plaintiff’s alleged misconduct. Counsel for 
the principal read a written indorsement of the principal 
signed by other teachers in the school which was prepared 
by the sub-master of the school. 
2. Counsel for the plaintiff was refused permission 
by the chairman of the board to call any pupil to be 
examined on a question between the principal and a student. 
The counsel for the plaintiff stated that the only evidence 
he tad was the testimony of the accused and his fellow 
students, some of whom had been referred to ir the statement 
of the principal, and if he could not call them he could 
go no further. The chairman of the board then said that 
any boys who wished to volunteer a statement on the matter 
or contradict anything said of him by the principal might 
do so. Hone of the boys volunteered any testimony. 
3. The school committee then voted to sustain the 
action of the principal in suspending the plaintiff and 
that the plaintiff be fornally given leave to withdraw 
18. 
from school. The boy did not withdraw and was not 
allowed to attend the school. 
Having heard the record of proceedings at the 
school committee hearing, the judge instructed the jury 
that the question was: Did the school committee give the 
boy a fair, reasonable opportunity to present his case 
before them If they did, the jury were to po no further. 
If they did not, the city was liable. 
The jury founo for the plaintiff. 
The case was then submitted to the State Supreme Cuurt 
which if it found that the rules and instructions on the 
question of liability were erroneous, was to set aside the 
verdict and grant a new trial. The court ruling follows. 
1. The committee undoubtedly believed that a compulsory 
examination of pupils in regard to matters which they 
probably consider confidential, would be detrimental to 
the interests of the school. 
2. v© cannot hold tnat a hearing in regard to the 
exclusion of a pupil from a school must be conducted 
with all the formalities of a trial in a court or that 
a ranterI'd mistake, innocently made by a school committee 
in conducting a hearing, will make his exclusion unlawful. 
3. Since it has not been contended that the committee 
was acting other than in good faith, we are of the opinion 
that there was an error in the instruction on the question 
of liability. 
4. Hew trial ordered. 
19 
MOHR I SOS VS. XAWHKNCB 
186 Kass. 456 
At the new trial ordered by the Supreme Court (181 Kaos. 
127), the jury on the question whether or not the school 
committee acted in good faith, returned a verdict for the 
plaintiff in the sum of ?750.00 and the defendant’s alleged 
exceptions. 
The decision of the Supreme Court on the alleged 
exceptions, follows: 
1. The jury after hearing in detail the eport of the 
school committee meeting, had to d^tt>rmine whether in 
pursuing this course, the school committee were actuated by 
a spirit of judicial fairness, or whether their conduct 
was susceptible of other interpretations. 
2. As none of the pupils present offered themselves 
as witnesses, the legitimate effect of the decision was to 
cause tne exclusion of lawful evidence that might have been 
Introduced and that was material to the plaintiff’s defense, 
and could not be supplied from any othrr source. This method 
of procedure when intelligently adopted by a tribunal charged 
with an impartial Investigation of fact, to be followed by 
a determination of the rights of the plaintiff cannot be 
considered a hearing in the accustomed sense, or to denote 
an inquiry of a jut iclal character. 
20 
o. If the course pursued was found to exhibit on their 
part either prejudice against the plaintiff whose conduct 
wne uncer investigation, or wilful indifference to his 
righto, there would be evidence to support an allegation 
that they were not acting with a desire to raeet the full 
requirements of ouch a hearing, but intentionally went 
outside of them for some purpose that, whether wrongful 
or lawful, equally resulted in a wrong to him. 
4. The decision of the Jury granting dnrnges to the 
plaintiff is approved; exceptions over-ruled. 
s»ABJti:ns Jassa v;;. city of Fitchburg 
211 Hass. 66 
In 1908 Paulino Jones, tho plaintiff, was suspended 
from a public school In Fitchburg, Huaoachusett», by 
principal Fopkins for refusing tc obey hiu directions. 
It was further stated tiiat she could return to school on 
the condition tiiat she submit to tue direction of the 
principal of the school. 
The plaintiff sought damages for unlawful exclusion 
from the public schools. Such action was br.scd on the 
grounds that the plaintiff should not have been expelled 
without first having received a hearing before the school 
committee 
21. 
The lower court found for the plaintiff, judging the 
exclusion to be unlawful. 
The iiupreiae Court, concurring, rendered the following 
d* cision: 
1. The general management of the public schools 
having been conferred on the school committee, the 
plaintifffe exclusion was not unlawful, unless they acted 
in violation of the provisions which require that a hearing 
be granted before a permanent exclusion for discipline 
is made. 
2. The plaintiff,s father adoressed a written 
application to the committee asking that a statement in 
writing be furnished giving reasons for his daughter’s 
exclusion. The school committee upon receiving this 
request, should have held a hearing and decided the question 
whether she had been guilty of insubordination, and their 
decision affirming the order, if made in good faith, 
would be final. 
3. dince the committee did not grant a hearing but 
voted to inform him that the plaintiff had been suspended 
for refusing to obey the principal’s directions, and that 
she could return to school at any time upon acceding to the 
authority of the principal, the lower court was warranted 
in finding that the severance of the plaintiff from the 
22 
school Tor what amounted to a permanent exclusion 
could not be justified unless preceded by the hearing. 
AiiTSLL VS. 3TGKHS 
237 Hass. 103 
The School Committee of the City of Haverhill* 
Has.- achuoetts* passed the folloting rule entitled; 
"Regulations on fraternities and her or i ties.** 
f0n and after hay 15, 1933, no student in the 
Haverhill High School Shall be pledged to or join a 
secret organization composed wholly or in part of 
high school pupils, unless said organization is 
approved by the Superintendent and xTincipal of 
Haverhill High School, nor shall a student member or 
student members of euch secret organizations as now 
exist pledge, initiate, accept or attempt to pledge, 
initiate or accept a fellow student into membership. 
The wearing of jerseys, sweaters. Gaps or other 
conspicuous evidence of membership in an unapproved 
secret organization is hereby forbidden on the school 
premises. The president or other officer of efery 
unapproved secret organization now existing -hall 
file with the principal: 
a. Name of organization, 
b. List of all student members, 
c. Hates and places of all meetings, 
d. rregraxas, dates and places of all house 
parties or other gatarings, whether occurring 
during school year or in short vacations. 
The penalty for violations of any of the above 
regulations is exclusion from the Haverhill High School. 
The principal of the high school may adopt such other 
rules and penalties as seem to him best for the close 
regulation of such fraternities and sororities as now 
exist until they shall pass out of existence and such rules 
shall be considered additions to the regulations given 
above.1 
23. 
After the passage of the above law, the high school 
principal prepared registration blankB reading as folio?a: 
‘ Hy signature signifies that I __ have read 
carefully the school conucittee* s regulation*! and promise 
on ny honor to observe then.” while all pupils indicated 
by signature that they would adhere to the above law, 
soxae violated the rule and pledge and were excluded from 
school. 
The plaintiff stated that the School Committee did 
not h'iVe power under the law to pass and enforce the rule 
in question. 
The State Supreme Court rendered the following 
decision: 
1* Rule was within the grant of power to the school 
committee. 
2. Rule was not invalid because it merely forbade 
the solicitation and initiation of new members and did 
not abolish such societies forthwith. 
3. The stated penalty of expulsion from school 
for violation of the rule did not exceed the power of 
the school committee. 
4. No right guaranteed by the Constitution of the 
United States was infringed. 
5. The petitions must be dismissed. 
24 
PSCK VS. SMITH 
41 Conn. 442 
The defendant, a member of the school committee in 
School District #5, was assisting in preparing the fire 
in one of the schools of the district. The defendant 
requested the plaintiff, a sixteen year old student, to 
remove some chalk marks he had previously made on the 
stove pipe. The plaintiff answered in a saucy manner 
becoming uncouth and profane in his language, When the 
plaintiff refused to stop swearing, the defendant laid 
his hand upon the plaintiff’s shoulder and using no 
unnecessary force, led him out of the school house. The 
teacher arriving at the time of the ejection, heard the 
oaths and saw the action of the defendant but made no 
objection. 
The plaintiff took his books home and did not offer 
himself or attempt to return to the school, or complain 
to the defendant or to the other members of the school 
committee, nor was anything done by the defendant to prevent 
his return. 
Joseph Taylor, with whom the plaintiff resided, called 
on two other members of the school committee, informing 
them of the facts and stating that the plaintiff wished to 
be placed in school again but they reiused to tax© any 
action. He then called on the board of education of the 
25. 
town who stated that they had no right to reinstate 
the plaintiff. 
The plaintiff in pressing charges argued that: 
1. The defendant was liable in trespass, not only 
for violence used by him to person of the plaintiff, but 
also from the injuries and loss arising from his exx>ulaion 
from school. 
2. The defendant did not, under the provisions of 
the eighty-fourth (84th) section of our statute entitled: 
"An Act concerning Education,” possess the pov/er of 
expulsion. 
The State Supreme Court found for the defendant, 
ruling that he was justified in peaceably removing the 
plaintiff using no unnecessary force for the purpose. 
XIDDKR VS. CHELLIS 
59 Hew Hampshire 473 
The defendant, a teacher in a district school in 
ilnfield, after a preliminary interview by the school 
committee, began teaching January 22, 1879, without a 
certificate. The certificate was granted by the committee 
on the evening of February 3rd. 
The plaitniff, a student 18 years of age. having been 
given from January 31st to February 3rd to prepare and 
26. 
deliver an oral topic, was suspended on the morning of 
the third until such time as he would deliver the oral 
topic. The plaintiff returned to school in the afternoon 
but would not recite and when he refused to leave the 
school, he was forcefully ejected by the teacher. 
The plaintiff sought damages on the grounds that: 
1. The defendant was not fully inveated with the 
office of teacher since he was not in receipt of a 
certificate as required by law. 
2. The defendant had no right to make and enforce 
the regulation in question, i.e. to require plaintiff to 
prepare and deliver an oral topic by a given date and if 
such recitation was not made by said date, to suspend him 
from school until such time as he would recite. 
The Supreme Court handed down the following decision: 
1. Although not a public teacher by legal appoint¬ 
ment, he was a teacher in fact anci his authority to govern 
the school could not be contested by those who sought to 
avail themselves of its advantages. 
2. As no unnecessary force was used to remove the 
plaintiff from the room for non-compliance with a reasonable 
and useful regulation ofthe school, the plaintiff cannot 
recover, and the defendant is entitled to judgment on 
the report. 
27. 
SUMMARY. The decisions rendered in the State Supreme 
Court cases outlined In this section offer the following* 
answers to the questions proposed at the beginning of 
this chai>ter. 
1. School committee have the authority to make all 
reasonable rules for ihe regulation of the schools and 
also to exclude a student for sufficient cause. 
2. School committee have the right to pass laws 
limiting or suspending secret organizations composed 
wholly or in part of school children. 
2. School committee may expel a student whose 
actions off the school premises arc detrimental to the 
best interests of the school. 
4. Decisions made by a school cormiittee acting in 
good faith on a question within their discretion are not 
subject to revision by the courts. 
5. Power of the school committee to govern and 
requirement to keep a record of votes does not necessarily 
imply that every act in regard to the management of the 
school should be confirmed by a formal vote. 
5. School committee must grant a hearing to a 
student being excluded from school for misconduct if 
pupil so desires. 
7. At a hearing before the school committee, the 
student or his counsel is entitled to present all the 
facts in the case. 
8. (a) Powers of the school committee can be 
delegated to its ’various members and teachers* 
(b) Persons serving as teachers, although not 
legally appointed, are granted the authority necessary 
to govern the schools. 
9 . Students can be forcefully removed from the 
room if no unnecessary force is used. 
10. An individual expelled from school has no 
right to bring an action against the town or city without 




The pursuit of intellectual training demands that: 
1# Our curricula include informative material, 
studies requiring accuracy and those subjects which enable 
an individual to express his ideas logically and fluently. 
2. Standards be established to which pupils must 
attain before being allowed to advance to a higher grade. 
This second part of the article from an analysis of 
decisions rendered by State Supreme Courts on cases 
involving scholarship, proposes answers to the following 
questions: 
1. Who possesses the authority to establish the 
curriculum and set standards for promotion to an 
advanced grade? 
2. Are the decisions of the school committee when 
relating to scholarship, subject to change by the courts? 
3. What action nay the Bch^ol committee take if a 
student does not conform to the scholarship requirements? 
4. Are the school committee required to give a 
hearing to a pupil excluded for failure in his studies? 
5. Are teachers subjeot to direct interference by 
parents and members of the community? 
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STATUTES QOV ARSING SCHOLARSHIP, In order to raore clearly 
interpret the court decisions outlined in this section, 
that portion of the Massachusetts School law involving 
scholarship is listed. 
HASCAjCHIISSTtS, 
Chapter 71, Section 1 (As amended 1921, 360; 1923, 
222, S. 1) Maintenance of public schools. Every town 
shall maintain, for at least one hundred and sixty days 
in each school year, unless specifically exempted as to 
any one year by the department of education, in this 
chapter called the department, a sufficient number of 
schools for the instruction of all children who may 
legally attend a public school therein. Such schools 
shall be taught by teachers of competent ability and 
good morals, and shall give instruction and training in 
orthography, reading, writing, the English language 
and grammar, geography, arithmetic, drawing, the history 
and constitution of the United States, the dutiee of 
citisonBhip, physiology and hyglehe, good behavoir, 
indoor and outdoor games and athletic exercise. In 
connection with .physiology ami hygiene, instruction as 
to the ef ccts of alcoholic drinks and of stimulants and 
narcotics on the human system and as to tuberculosis and 
its prevention, shall be given to all pupils in all 
schools under public control, except schools maintained 
solely for Instruction in particular branches, ouch other 
subjects as the school committee considers expedient my 
be taught in the public schools. 
Chapter 71, Section 2 (As amended 1923, 222; S. 2; 
1938, 246). Teaching of American history, civics. 
constitution of the United States, etc. In all public 
elementary and high schools American history and civics, 
including the constitution of the United States, and in 
all public high schools the constitution of the coiaaon- 
wealth, shall be taught as required subjects for the 
purpose of promoting civic service and a greater knowledge 
thereof, and of fitting pupils, morally and intellectually, 
for the duties of citizenship. 
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Chapter 71, Section 37. Puties of school coiaittee. 
It shall have general ciiarge of all the public schools, 
inducing the evening schools and evening high schools 
and of vocational schools and departments when not 
otherwise provided for. It may determine, subject to this 
chapter, the number of weeks and hours during which such 
schools shall be in session, and may make regulations 
as to attendance therein. 
LAW CASES INVOLVING EXPULSION FOR SCHOLARSHIP DgETCIKNCIKS. 
A digest of cases in Massachusetts and Vermont in which 
students were expelled for failure to satisfy scholarship 
standards follows. 
JOHN A. WATSON VS. CITY OF CAMBRIDGE 
157 Lass. 561 
The plaintiff was excluded from the schools in 1835, 
"because he was too weak-minded to derive profit from 
instruction." later he was taken on trial for two weeks and 
at the end of that time was again excluded. Records furthrr 
show that, "it appears from the statements of teachers who 
have observed him, and from the certificate of physicians, 
that he is so weak in mind as not to derive any marks and 
benefit from instruction, and, further that he is troublesome 
to other children, making uncouth noises, pinching others, 
etc. He is also found unable to take the ordinary decent 
care of himself." 
The plaintiff sought to recover damages for his exclusion 
from the schools of Cambridge by the school cojamittee. 
The Superior Court returned a verdict in favor of 
the plaintiff* 
The State Supreme Court, reversing the decision of 
the lower court, rendered the following opinion: 
1. The decision of the school coEsaittec of a city 
or town, acting in good faith in the management of the 
schools, upon matters of fact directly affecting the good 
order and discipline of the schools, is final so far as it 
relates to the right of pupils to enjoy the privileges of 
the school* 
2. The school committee have general charge and 
superintendence of all the public schools in the town or 
city; if the committee act honestly in an effort to do 
their duty, a jury composed of men of no special fitness 
to decide educational questions should not be permitted 
to soy that the answer is wrong* 
3* The court rules that in this case, the decision 
of the school committee is not subject to revision in 
the courts* 
CXJHTOH ?. BAH3AHD VS* INHABITANTS 0? SHKLBURHS 
216 23*80. 19 
The plaintiff entered high school in the autumn of 
1910 and from the first he fell below the required standard 
of excellence in one or more branches of instruction. 
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In Becoinber the father was informed of the 
deficiencies with the suggestion that the boy drox> back 
to the ninth grade for the remainder of the year to get 
a better prei/aration with which to do high school work, 
tcnduct of the boy was not responsible for his deficiencies 
in studies. 
Upon receipt of the letter, the boy remained away from 
school until larch; presenting himself at this time, he was 
refused admission by the principal until he had seen the 
chairman of the school committee. The boy was informed by 
the chairman of the school committee that he could not 
re-enter school until he further prepared himself. 
On April 10th the father of the plaintiff applied in 
writing to the oohool committee for a statement of the 
reasons for exclusion. 
Plaintiff brought tort against the town of Shelburne 
for alleged wrongful expulsion from the public high school 
of that town. 
Lower court rendered a verdict for the plaintiff 
granting €325.00 for damages sustained. 
The State Supreme Court, handing down the following 
Judgment, reversed the decision of the lower court: 
34. 
1. The duty of care and management of public 
echocla which is vested in a school committee, included 
the right to establish and maintain standards for the 
promotion of pupils from one grade to another and for 
their continuance in any particular grade; and, so long 
as the committee act in good faith in the performance 
of such duty, their conduct is not subj< ct to review 
by any other tribunal* 
2. Where a child has been excluded by a school 
coianittee in good faith from a certain school or grade 
because of his failure to satisfy the standard of 
scholarship set by the school committee for that school 
or grade, and he is given an opportunity to attend another 
school or grade adapted to his ability and accomplishments 
there has been no "unlawful exclusion” of the child from 
the public schools. 
3. Where the ground of exclusion of a child from a 
public school is failure in his studies and not misconduct, 
the school committee are not required to give the pupil an 
opportunity for a hearing. 
35. 
Kl&iA WULFF VS. IHHABITAJfTS OF WAXSFI3JJD 
221 haas. 427 
The defendant, a teacher in the Wakefield schools, 
had appointed a pupil as an assistant to perform the 
purely mechanical work of comparing the answers to 
problems worked out by pupils with the correct answers 
contained in a "key book." 
A problem in bookkeeping submitted by the plaintiff 
was marked wrong by the assistant. After working on the 
problem for another week and a half, the problem was passed 
in and again graded by the assistant as incorrect. The 
plaintiff worked on the problem additional week and then 
submitted the same result to the teacher who marked the 
answer correct. 
The plaintiff in pressing charges argued: 
• 4 '? v t i ; 
1. As a consequence of the error in correcting by 
the assistant, the plaintiff worried, was nervous and lost 
her appetite and sleep. 
2. That the method of correcting papers was improper 
and that the school committee should request the teacher to 
correct her work. 
lending Leering on the abo\e charges, the plaintiff 
did not attend to work, continued to absent herself 
nnd for this action, was suspended from school* 
The Supreme Court basing its decision on the 
Question of whether & parent has the right to say a 
certain method of teaching any given course of study 
shall be pursued, found for the defendant. 
1. The determination of the procedure and the 
znanageitent snd direction of pupils and studies in 
this CoiaaonTrealth rests in the wise direction and sound 
Judgment of teachers and bchool committees whose action 
in these respects are not subject to the supervision of 
this court. 
2. The plaintiff was without right in requiring 
that the principal personally should attend to the 
supervision of her individual work, perhaps to the neglect 
of more important duties* 
3. Court does believe that it is a poor policy to 
set a rival pupil in Judgment upon the work of an eager 
and zealous competitor* 
5? 
GEORGS GUBRUSBY VS. DAHIE1 *. I XY/CIB 
32 Vermont 224 
During the school term 1857-1858, the plaintiff, a 
boy of eighteen, who resided with his father, refused to 
write compositions in school. 
The plaintiff was asked by the Prudential Oocsaittee, 
who bad supervision over the schools, to either write the 
composition as directed by the teacher or to bring a written 
request from hie father that he be excused from such 
assignment. 
When the plaintiff refused to: 
1. write the composition, 
2. bring a written request from his father asking 
that he be excused, the Prudential Coraaittee told the 
plaintiff that he must not come to school unless he would 
obey the regulations, and instructed the teacher* if he 
came, not to treat him r.s a scholar. At the end of three 
weeks during which time he was refused assistance by the 
teacher, the plaintiff stopped attending school. 
The lover court rendered the following opinion: 
1. The requirement of the teacher in regard to compo¬ 
sitions was reasonable and proper, and that by Judicious 
means, she endeavored to induce the plaintiff to comply 
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therewith, and that there was no sufficient reason 
for hio not complying with it. 
2. If the father of the plaintiff had requested 
the teacher not to require the plaintiff to write 
compositions, he would hawe been excused therefrom. 
3. Teacher ceased to instruct plaintiff as a 
scholar, • cting under the directions of the rrudential 
Committee, because the plaintiff refused to obey the 
requirement to write compositions and brought no request 
from hie father that he might be excused from so doing. 
4. Plaintiff left the school solely on account of 
the teacher1s refusal to instruct him and upon these 
facts, the court rendered judgment for the defendant, the 
Prudential Committee. 
The State Supreme Court confirmed the judgment of 
the lower court with the following opinion: 
1. Statute requires "each organized town to keep 
nnd support one or more echccla, provided with competent 
teachers, of good morals, for the instruction of the young 
in orthography, reading, writing, English grammar, 
geography, arithmetic, history of the Onited States and 
good behawoir.** 
39, 
2. Regarding those branches which are required 
to be taught in the public schools, the Prudential 
Committee and the teachers must of necessity have some 
discretion as to the order of teaching them, the pupils 
v<ho shall be allowed to pursue these studies and the 
mode in which they shall be taught. 
3. In regard to instruction in the specific 
branches of common school education, the writing of 
English composition in different forms nay be regarded 
as an allowable mode of teaching the majority of 
subjects, i.e. grammar, geography , history. 
SUlff/ARY. These answers to questions proposed at the 
beginning of this chapter are obtained from the Supreme 
Court decisions rendered in the cases reviewed above: 
1. School committee have a right and a duty to 
establish and maintain BtandardB for promotion to and 
continuance of pupils in any particular grade. 
2. Decisions of a school committee acting honestly 
in an effort to do their duty are not subject to change 
by the courts. 
40 
? i* 
3. student excluded from a particular grade for 
failure to meet scholastic standards hut offered an 
opportunity to continue in another grade has not been 
wunlawfully excluded*" 
4. School committee are not required to give a 
pupil an opportunity for a hearing when exclusion is 
■ / • i 
for failure in studies and not misconduct* 
5. Teachers* under ihe supervision of the school 
conirsiittee are responsible for the procedure and method 
of instruction in the class room and are not subject 




patriotic devotion, the salute and pledge of allegiance 
to our flag, enkindles in the hearts of students the noble 
sentiments of love, joy, pride, honor and devotion* 
This third section of the article proposes to answer 
the following questions concerning patriotic ceremonies 
in our public schools. 
1. Is the salute to the flag a religious rite or 
a patriotic ceremony? 
2. Does the requirement to salute the flag violate 
any rights granted by the state or federal constitution? 
3. What degree of respect is due to the flag of 
one’s country? 
4. Are all children attending public schools 
required to salute the flag? 
5. Has the legislature the right to pass a law 
requiring public school students to salute the flag? 
6. What action may be taken by a school committee 
if a pupil refuses to salute or pledge allegiance to 
the flag? 
statutes governing patriotic ca.&Mcmias ih thk schools. 
The educational laws of the several states governing 
patriotic ceremonies in the schools, are listed in order 




^action 69 (As amendeu 1935, 258} Plage, provisions 
for anct display — The School Committee shall provide-— 
flags-—. A flag shall be displayed on school grounds on 
every school day — or legal holiday —. A flag shall 
be displayed in each assembly hall-—. Sach teacher shall 
cause the pxipila under his charge to salute the flag and 
recite in unison with hira at said openings exercises at 
least once each week the "Hedge of Allegiance to the Flag.* 
failure— five consecutive days by the principal — to 
display the flag — or failure for — two weeks to salute 
the flag ana recite said pledge — to cause pupils under 
his charge to ao so shall be punished far every such 
period by a fine — snail subject members — to a like 
penalty. 
llSW JJZRSKY. 
dy Chapter 145, P. L. 1932, i . 260 - 2Jew Jersey State 
Annual 1932, 185-230} Kvery board of education in this 
state is obliged to procure a United States flag for each 
school in the district. The flog is to be displayed upon 
or near the public school building during school hours. 
It is also necessary to procure for each assembly room 
another flag which shall be displayed and pupils are 
required to salute the flag, and repeat the oath of 
allegiance every school day -- “I pledge allegiance — " 
’’with liberty ana justice for all." 
G20KGIA. 
On March 26, 1935 the General Assembly of Georgia 
passed a resolution declaring tiiat: It is a part of 
the duty of every patriotic citizen to x>ledge allegiance 
to the fleg of our country and whereas every man, woman 
and child of this state owes a similar allegiance to the 
flag of Georgia. 
44. 
LAW CASKS IhVChVIHG iOi/’JLSION FOB FAILURE TO SALUTE 
THE FIAG. The Jehovah Witnesses, plaintiffs in the 
following cases, are members of n religious sect who 
are conscientiously opposed to saluting the flag since 
they consider such action to be a direct violation of 
' > f * . * 
the divine con;iandacnta laic down in the Bible. 
A brief oigost of expulsion cases in Massachusetts, 
New York, Hew Jersey, Pennsylvania, Georgia and 
California for failure to conform to existing regulations 
governing patriotic ceremonies in the public school 
foilowe. 
joimnoN vs. town of Deerfield 
25 Fed. Gupp. 918 
On October 14, 1938 the school committee of the 
town of Deerfield in accordance with the General laws 
relating to education, passed the following resolution: 
Voted that all children attending the public 
schools in Deerfield be requixveo to salute the flag. 
Any infraction from tne rule snail be pen&liseu oy 
expulsion from the school until such pupils comply 
with this statute." 
45. 
On Ootober 21, 1938 three pupils, members of the 
Jehovah Witnesses, were expelled for refusal to salute 
the fla^:* 
The plaintiffs brought a bill of complaint before 
the district Federal Court for the purpose of obtaining 
a declaratory judgment decreeing a statute of Massachusetts 
on which the above rule was based void, ns violating the 
rights secured to the plaintiff by the Constitution of the 
United States* In presenting their case the plaintiffs, 
three minor children and their father, argued: 
1. The flag salute law deprives then without due 
process of law of liberties guaranteed to them by the 
fourteenth (14th) amendment of the Constitution. 
a. liberties under the fourteenth (14th) 
amendment are right of religious freedom and the right to 
obtain an education in the public schools. 
b. Statute requiring flag salute when considered 
in connection with the laws of l£assachueetts compelling 
school attendance abridges these liberties. 
2. ^ince they honestly and conscientiously believe 
that the salute to the flag is a religious rite, their 
belief prevails and the law must yield to it. 
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3. The law does not accomplish its intended purpose. 
The district Federal Court reviewing the case, handed 
down the following decision January 4, 1939: 
1. The flag salute and pledge of allegiance here in quest!o 
do not in any just sense relate to religious worship—~ they are 
wholly patriotic in design and purpose. 
2. The salute and pledge do not go beyond what is due to 
government. 
3. — -nothing in the salute— which constitutes an act 
of idolatry-— or strains a human being in respect to worshipping 
God within the meaning of the words of the Constitution. 
4. —rule and statues— within the competency of 
legislative authority—- nothing in opposition to religion- 
directed to a justifiable end— education in the public schools. 
5. Statute does not Impair plaintiffs’ religious liberty in 
violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth (14th) 
amendment. 
6. Enacted statute upheld by the Court of Massachusetts 
as within the power of the legislature today as a proper 
regulation of the public schools supported by the state. 
7. —one cannot excuse a practice contrary to statute 
because of a religious belief. Chief Justice Vttiite— to permit 
this would be— in effect to permit every citizen to become 
a law unto himself. 
8. Argument that the law does not accomplish its 
intended xAirpooe might properly be addressed to the legislative 
than to the court. 
47. 
9. Plaintiff* a application Tor interlocutory 
injunction la deniau. We dismiss bill of complaint. 
KICHQX13 Ts. mayor hto pgrqql CQHS&ft&s 
OF LYNii t UASSACIPTSSTl’E 
H. S. 2d Ld. - 577 
The school committee of Lynn, Massachusetts, in 
accordance witbthe General Laws relating to education, 
enacted the following law: 
1. Lynn School Rule 18 ™ Salute to the Flag. 
The following salute to the f3 ag shall be given in every 
school at least once a week and at ouch tines as occasion 
may warrant. “I pledge allegiance —— with liberty and 
justice for all." 
At the opening of school, September 1935, it was 
observed that the petitioner, a male child, while stand¬ 
ing during the salute and recitation of the pledge, was 
otherwise taking no port therein. 
On September 30, 1935 there was repeated a refusal 
by the petitioner to join in the salute to the flag and 
the pledge of allegiance as a part of the opening 
fxercises. 
The school committee expelled the petitioner October 
8, 1935 after a hearing before the father represented by 
counsel and respondents, until such time as by his own 
free will he would comply with the rule. 
48. 
The plaintiff flecking a writ of mandamus to compel 
the school authorities to admit him to the school, 
Justified Mb action, failure to salute and pledge 
allegiance to the flag, as follows: 
1. Article 2 of the declaration of Rights of the 
Constitution of this Commonwealth, "no subject will be •*«.— 
restrained —- from worshipping God-to the dictates of 
Ma own conscience of religious sentiments; provided he 
does not disturb the public pence or obstruct others in 
their religioue worship, " 
2. Section 1 of Article 18 of the Amendments of the 
Constitution of hassachuoetto as found in Article 46 of 
the Amendments, "No law shall be passed prohibiting the 
free exorcise of religion." 
3. No child shall be excluded from a public school 
of any town on account or. race, color or religion. 
The Supreme Judicial Court of &assachusetts rendered 
the following decleion April 1, 1037: 
1. The flag salute and pledge of allegiance here in 
question do not in any sense relate to religion. They are 
wholly patriotic in design and purpose. 
2. The salute and pledge do not go beyond that which, 
according to generally recognised i->rincii>lee, is due to 
government. There is nothing in the salute or pledge of 
allegiance which apxnroacheo to any religious observance. 
49. 
It does not in any reasonably sense hurt, molest or 
restrain a human being in respect to ’’worshipping God* 
within tiie meaning of the words of the Constitution, 
3. Rule eighteen (18) of the school committee is 
not invalid and the petloner fails to show that any 
of his rights have been violated, 
4, The petition is dismissed, 
HKRIBQ VS. STATE BOARi> 07 EDUCATION (NEW JERSEY) 
117 HJL - 455 
189 A - 629 
In 1936 a child was expelled from public school by 
the btate Board of Education of New Jersey for failure 
to salute the flag and give the oath of allegiance 
every day. 
The plaintiffs, John and Kiln Bering and children, 
sought a writ of mandamus to compel the school authori¬ 
ties to return the plaintiff to school. It was the 
contention of the plaintiffs that statute requiring salute 
to the flag was invalid as infringing the constitutional 
and statutory guarantees of equal free schools for all 
people• 
The Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey, 
reviewing the case, rendered the following decision: 
1. Those who resort to educational institutions 
maintained with the state’s money are subject to the 
commands of the state. 
50. 
2. The perforraance of the eoLsnaml of the statute 
in question could in no sense interfere with religious 
freedom. ’ledge of allegiance is not a religious rite; 
it i8 a patriotic ceremony which tht! legislature has 
the power to require of those attending schools estab~ 
lisheb at public expense. 
3. A child of tchool age is not required to attend 
thr institutions maintained by the public, but is required 
to attend a suitable school. Those who do not desire to 
conform with th* commands of the statute can seek their 
schooling elsewhere. 
4. The order of expulsion und*r review i» affirmed 
and the writ is dismissed. 
JOBS AH) TLLA EKHllO VS. STATK BuAHU 07 EDUCATIGH 
of stat*£ of uv J::nsHY 
303 0. 3. 624 
82 L. Ed. 1087 
•£-’ ■ * 
The decision on an appeal to the United States Supreme 
Court by the plaintiffs from the Court of Errors and 
Appeals of the State of Kew Jersey, follows. (Details of 
case appear in previous digest.) 
The Supreme Court of the United States on Karch 14, 
1938 ruled to dismiss the appeal foe want of a substantial 
Federal question. § 
— ;qitn\nnni for want of a substantial !ftederaX question, 
means that every question brought to the court is *eo 
clearly not debateable and utterly lacking in merit 
as to require dismissal for want of substance. 
l^OLEU VS. lAHDEBS 
192 S.S. 218 
In 1935 the Board of Education of the City of 
Atlanta passed a resolution requiring all pupils in 
the city schools to participate in patriotic exercises 
including individual salute to the United States flag, 
as lawful and reasonable and in keeping with the policy 
of instructing youth in devotion to the American 
Constitution, institutions and ideals. 
The petitioner, Dorothy Leoles, refused to salute 
the flag as required by tho city board of education, 
and w&b expelled. 
The petitioner then sought a writ of mandamus to 
compel the school authorities to readmit her to school. 
She justified her position, refusal to salute the flag, 
with the following arguments: 
1• The plaintiff 
a. refused to Balute the flag for the sole 
reason that she believes to do so is an 
act of worship of nn image or emblem; 
b. did not refuse to pledge allegiance; 
c. 1b a good and loyal citizen of the United 
states and City of Atlanta; 
d. believes in the American form of government 
o. contends that conformity to the regulation 
in question "salute to flag of the United 
States*', denies equal protection of the law 
52 * 
due process of the law and further infringes 
the provisions of trie state constitution 
prohibiting the establishment of religion 
and securing to her religious freedom nd 
seeks to compel her to act in disobedience 
to her religious beliefs and teachings. 
The Superior Court dismissed the writ of mandamus. 
The plaintiff brought error and the case was 
reviewed by the Supreme Court of Georgia which handed 
down the following Judgment: 
1. The United States is a land of freedom; however, 
those who reside within itsllimits and receive the 
protection and benefits afforded tu them must obey its 
laws and show due respect to the government, its 
institutions and ideals. The flag of the United States 
is a symbol thereof; disrespect to the flag is disrespect 
to the government, its institutions and ideals and is 
directly opposed to the policy of this state. 
2. The regulation requiring "salute to the flag" does 
not violate the fundamental rights and provisions of the 
Constitution of Georgia. 
3. Those choosing to resort to the educational 
institutions maintained with the funds of tne state are 
subject to the commando of the state. 
4# The rule and regulation of the board of 
education of Atlanta, requiring the students of the 
public schools hereof to salute the flag of the United 
States, in no common-sense view thereof really inter¬ 
feres with the plaintiff’s religious freedom. 
5. The act of saluting the flag is not a religious 
rite; it is an act showing one’s respect for the 
government. 
6. A child is not required to attend public school 
if suitable education can be obtained from some other 
school giving instruction in the ordinary brandies of 
the iSngliah education. 
LEOLKS V 3. XJUP3RS 
302 U. S. 656 
82 L.Ed. 507 
The decision on an appeal to the United States 
Supreme Court by the plaintiff from the Supreme Court 
of the State of Georgia, follows. (Details of case 
appear in previous digest.) 
On December 13, 1937 the Supreme Court of the 
United States ruled: 
1. The motion of the appellees to dismiss the 
appeal is granted and the appeal is dismissed for 
want of a substantial Federal question. #-- 
# . Dismissal for want of a substantial Federal question 
means that every question brought to the court is 
wso clearly not debateable and utterly lacking in 
merit as to require dismissal for want of substance. 
54. 
rEOirrs VS. S AED3TRG& 
18 JJ. B. 340 
The plaintiff, Grace I’andstrom, thirteen (13) 
years rf age, refused to salute and pledge allegiance 
to the flag of cause it was contrary to the rcligionn 
of the Jehovah -itnosses of which the ia a member. 
After each refusal to salute the flag, the girl v*ns 
sent home and was again returned to school by the 
parents. 
The plaintiff sought dauageo on the grounds that 
the demand to salute the flag is in violation of the 
State Constitution (Art. 1, Sec. 3) which reads: 
*The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession 
unci worship,without discrimination or preference, 
shall forever be allowed in this state to all unkind; 
and no person shall be rendered incompetent to be a 
witness on account of his opinion on matters of 
reiigiouc belief; cut the liberty of confidence hereby 
secured shall not be so construed as to excuse act 
of licentiousness, or Justify practices inconsistent 
with pea~e or safety of thin state." 
The Stitte 3u;>reme Court handed down the following 
decision: 
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1* salute to the flag is in no sense an act 
of worship or species of idolatry nor does it consti¬ 
tute any approach to u religious observance. 
2. Since public opinion is vital to the maintenance 
of good government the state is justified in taking such 
measures as will engender and maintain patriotism in 
the schools. 
3. Grace in attending school provided by the 
state for her education should have participated in 
the ceremony with thr; other scholars. 
4. The plaintiff ia not entitled to damages. 
oaiiRiiaix vs. jqnciomoGK^ 
82 lac. 391 (Cal.) 
Charlotte Gabrieli!, nin* years of age, was 
expelled from Fremont School, a public school in the 
city of ocremento, for persistently refusing to 
participate in a ceremony of saluting and pledging 
allegiance to the flag. 3he refused to salute the flag 
because, being a member of the Jehovah Witnesses, it 
was contrary to her religious teaching. 
The plaintiff applied to the Superior Court in 
^ncremento County for a writ of mandate addressed to 
the authorities of the iiacremento School District, to 
56. 
compel her reinstatement aa a pupil of the Fremont 
uChool. In supporting her contention that she hah 
been illegally expelled, she presented the following 
arguments; 
1. The expulsion - 
a. has deprived h r of her right to attend 
the public schools without clue process of law in 
violation of the fourt enth (14th) amendment. 
b. constitutes a denial of the religious 
liberty guaranteed to the petitioner by the State 
And Federal Constitution. 
The Sup rior Court ieoued a judgment directing 
issuance of the peremptory writ. 
The defendants appealed to the State Supreme Court 
which, reversing thr judgment of the lower court, 
rendered the following opinion; 
1. The Supreme Court of the United States has 
twice dismissed appeal taken from state court judgments 
upholding the validity of regulations requireing the 
salute and pledge of allegiance to the flag as applied 
to pupils objecting on religious grounds. The action 
of said court in disposing of these appeals cannot be 
taken in any other sense than that no violation of 
respondent’s constitutional right in the instant 
case has been committed by the act of excluding 
respondent from attendance at said public school 
until she shall comply with the rule which she 
refugee to obey. 
2. e are of the view tiiat the rule prescribed 
by tiie board does not abridge any of the respondent’s 
constitutional rights by excluding her from attendance 
at the Saoremento city public school until such time 
as she shall comply with the rule nhich she refuses 
to obey* 
3* The legislature has conferred upon school 
boards, broad plenary powers to make all reasonable 
regulations that will, in the reasonable exercise of 
Judgment, promote the efficiency of the school system 
in performing public welfare duties* It is only where 
regulations are clearly shown to be in violation of 
the fundamental law that the court may annul them* 
We see no violation of any article of the federal or 
state constitution in the board*s exercise of power 
in the present case* 
4. The Judgment is reversed and the writ is 
discharged 
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SCHOOL DISTRICT vs. GOBITIS 
21 Fed. Supp. - 581 
On November 6, 1935 the school directors of the 
borough of Kinersville, bchuylkill County, Pennsylvania, 
adopted a school regulation requiring all teachers and 
pupils of the schools to salute the American flog as a 
part of the daily exercises and providing that refusal to 
salute the flag should be regarded a« an act of insub¬ 
ordination and should be dealt with accordingly. 
A few days later, the minor plaintiffs in this 
case, refused to salute the flag, and were expelled. 
The plaintiffs, members of the Jehovah Witnesses, 
then sought a bill of complaint to compel the school 
authorities to remove the participation in the ceremony 
of saluting the flag as a condition of the attendance of 
the plaintifffs children at school. They justified their 
position with the following arguments: 
1. The regulation requiring salute to the flag 
violated the fourteenth (14th) amendment in that it un¬ 
reasonably restricts the freedom of religious belief 
and worship. 
2. The plaintiffs are required to attend the 
defendant’s public schools since they are financially 
unable to go elsewhere; by reason of the regulation in 
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question, they are placed under legel compulsion to 
participate in an act of worship contrary to dictates 
of conscience. 
The lower court found for the plaintiff. The 
defendants then moved to have the District Federal Court 
dismiss the bill of complaint against them. 
The following decision was given December ig 1937 
by the District Federal Court: 
1. Kinor plaintiffs h ve a right to attend public 
schools and indeed a duty to do so if they are unable 
to secure an equivalent education privately. 
2. This court cannot yield to any doctrine which 
would permit public officers to determine whether the 
views of individuals sincerely undertaken on religious 
grounds are in fact based on convictions religious in 
character; to do so would be to sound the death knell 
of religious liberty. 
3. Action of minor defendants in refusing for 
conscience sake to salute the flag, a ceremony which they 
deem an ROt of worship, to be rendered to God alone, was 
within the rights of conscience guaranteed by the 
i ennsylvania Constitution._ 
4. Requirement of that ceremony as condition of 
the exercising of their right or the performance of their 
duty to attend public schools violated the Pennsylvania 
Constitution and infringed the liberty guaranteed them 
by the fourteenth (14th) amendment. 
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5* Courts who have reached a contrary conclusion, 
1. e. salute to the flag could have no religious 
significance— overlooked this fundamental principle 
of religious liberty, "no man, even though he be a 
school director or a Judge, is empowered to censor 
anotherfs religious convictions or set bounds to the 
areao of human conduct in wi;ich those convictions should 
be permitted to control his actions, unless compelled to 
do so by an over-riding public necessity which properly 
requires the exercise of the police power.” 
6. Refusal to salute the flag in school exercises 
could not in any way prejudice or imperil the public 
safety, health or morals or the property or personal 
rights of their fellow citizens. 
7. The motion to dismiss bill denied. 
liXHXiSVILLK SCHOOL DISTRICT VS. GOBITIS 
108 Fed. Supp. 2d - 683 
The decision on an appeal to the Circuit Court of 
Appeals, Third Circuit, by the defendant from the 
District Federal Court, follows. (Details of case appear 
in previous digest). 
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In a decision rendered on November 10, 1939, 
the Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, 
affirmed the decision of the District Court. 
If INKR8VILH3 SCHOOL DISTRICT VS. G0BITI3 
310 0. S. 586 
84 L. Ifld. 1375 
The decision on an appeal to the United States 
Supremo Court by the defendants from the Circuit Court 
of Appeale, Third Circuit, follows. (Details of case 
appeal* in previous digest.) 
On June 3, 1940 the Supreme Court of the United 
States with Judtices Franlcfurter and Reynolds in agreement, 
and Justice Stone dissenting, reversed the decisions of 
the lower courts and dismissed the bill of complaint 
against the defendants. 
This lias been the last c&ae to appear before the 
Supreme Court involving refusal to salute the flag and 
the decision rendered in thi3 instance will be understood 
to mean that there is nothing in the requirement to salute 
the flag which is in violation of the rights granted to 
us in our Federal Constitution. 
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SIBGEARY. the Stato and Federal Supreme Court cases 
reviewed in this section answer these questions 
proposed at the beginning of this chapter. 
1* Flag salute and pledge of allegiance do not 
relate to religious worship but are wholly patriotic 
in design and purpose. 
2. Statutes requiring flag salute and pledge of 
allegiance do not impair plaintiff’s roligious liberty 
in violation of the due process clause of the four¬ 
teenth (14th) amendment. 
3. Nothing in the law which restrains a human being 
in respect to worshipping God within the meaning of 
the words of the Constitution. 
4. (a) Salutes and pledges do not go beyond that 
which, according to generally recognized principles, is 
due to government. 
4. (b) Since the flag of the United States is a 
symbol thereof, disrespect to the flag is disrespect to 
the government, its institutions and ideals. 
5. Those who resort to educational institutions 
maintained with the state’s money are subject to the 
commands of the state. 
6. Hedge of allegiance is a patriotic ceremony 
which the legislature has the power to require of those 
attending schools established at public expense* 
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CHAPTER V. 
CONCLUSIOK. 
This study has offered an analysis of State and 
Federal Supreme Court decisions involving expulsion from 
public schools for deficiencies in discipline, scholar¬ 
ship and x>atriotism. 
From the court cases reviewed in this paper, it 
becomes etident that if a school coianittee act with 
reasonable judgment and in good faith, they may, by 
following the procedures set down in the statutes: 
1. expel pupils whose actions on or off the 
school grounds are detrimental to the best interests 
of the schools. 
2. exclude from a particular grade those pupils 
who fail to meet the scholastic standards. 
3. expel pupils who refuse to meet the requirements 
to salute and pledge allegiance to the flag. 
In addition to the right to expel for the above 
deficiencies, the court decisions further show that 
the school committee may: 
1. pass laws limiting or suspending secret 
organizations composed wholly or in part of school 
children. 
2. justify the use of corporal punishment. 
3. delegate its power to its various members and 
teachers * 
65. 
4. make all reasonable rules for the regulation 
of the schools. 
5. establish and maintain standards for promotion 
and continuance in any one grade. 
6. grant hearings to pupils being excluded for 
misconduct; refuse to grant hearings to pupils being 
excluded for scholarship deficiencies. 
7. protect thr teaching methods of the instructors 
from outside influence. 
8. require all students attending public schools 
to obey the laws governing these chools. 
The decisions rendered also show that the school 
committees in administering our public school system 
are exercising these powers in an equitable and just 
manner* 
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